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In the midst of the Great Depression, John Maynard Keynes wrote that many
decisions where the full effects will not be known for some time “can only be taken
as the result of animal spirits,” which Keynes defined as “a spontaneous urge to action
rather than inaction, and not as the outcome of a weighted average of quantitative
benefits multiplied by quantitative probabilities.”1 Historically, as well as in our present
age, one possible manifestation of this type of behavior might very well be the
phenomenon which has become known, metaphorically, as a “bubble.” What role, if any,
has the presence of asset market bubbles played in the current cycle of global financial
turbulence? If the determination is made that developments of this type has made their
presence known in these times, then what kind of insights from Christian reflection
might be brought to bear on the discussion over possible institutional, regulatory, and
educational responses that would be intended to reduce the likelihood of a repeat
performance in the future?
The opinion of economists with respect to the precise definition of a bubble
remains divided. Nobel Laureate Joseph Stiglitz has maintained that such an event exists
when the price of a asset rises “only (emphasis in the original) because investors believe
that the selling price will be high tomorrow.”2 This definition implies that changes in the
price of these assets are unrelated to what Peter Garber has referred to as “fundamentals,”
which “are a collection of variables that we believe should drive asset prices.”3 The
debate over the existence of asset bubbles is closely related to the question of whether or
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not contemporary economists still adhere to the assumption that Nobel Laureate Herbert
Simon characterized as the “classical theory of omniscient rationality.”4 If human
decision-makers truly possess such qualities, then there should be, by definition, no
changes in asset prices which cannot be explained in terms of underlying fundamentals.
From the standpoint of Christian theology, the omniscient half of such an outlook, if it is
meant literally, is inherently problematic, because Christians believe that only God
possesses perfect knowledge and that human beings are always making decisions in the
presence of some degree of ignorance.5 With respect to rationality, Stephen LeRoy has
written that the meaning of this term “in economic discussion appears to have
changed in recent years” to one that views rationality as “a conceptual tool used in
formulating economic models,” as opposed to “a substantive hypothesis about the
world.” 6 For example, Matthias Klaes and Esther Mirjam-Sent have concluded that
Simon was probably the first economist or social scientist to have employed the phrase
“bounded rationality” in order to refer to a more limited set of assumptions about human
capabilities.7 Simon defined this concept as consisting of “rational choice that takes into
account the cognitive limitations of the decision-maker – limitations of both knowledge
and computational capability.”8 According to Thomas Sargent, this approach, compared
with other definitions of rational behavior, no longer assumes that decision-makers
4
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maintain consistent perceptions, but instead update the rules by which they make choices
as new information becomes available.9 Even though these revised notions of human
rationality have become generally accepted elements of the neoclassical economic
paradigm, there is still a tendency to characterize asset bubbles as a manifestation of
irrational behavior that cannot exist, by definition, within the formal models that are
utilized in order to explain market behavior. Given the recent turbulence in global
financial markets, and the current experience of an international economic downturn, it
seems highly unlikely that large numbers of people would intentionally make decisions
that would lead to such outcomes if they had known in advance, or even had a rough
idea, that this would be the case. As LeRoy has observed, “It is a testament to
economists’ capacity for abstraction that they have accepted without question that an
intricate theoretical argument against bubbles has somehow migrated from the pages of
Econometrica to the floor of the New York Stock Exchange.”10
In his well-known book on the history of financial crises, Charles Kindleberger
wrote that while “there can be no doubt that rationality in markets in the long run is a
useful hypothesis . . . the pages of history are strewn with language, admittedly imprecise
and possibly hyperbolic, that allows no other interpretation than occasional irrational
markets and destabilizing speculation.”11 Kindleberger went on to identify six distinct,
but related, causes for these kind of developments, which he described as “manias” and
“panics”:
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1) Mob psychology;
2) Changes in behavior at different stages of a continuing process, where people
start out acting rationally, but then become increasingly irrational with the
passage of time;
3) Differences in rationality among different groups of traders, investors, or
speculators;
4) The fallacy of composition;
5) The failure of a market with rational expectations with respect to the quality
of a reaction to a given stimulus to estimate the right quantity (emphases in
the original);
6) Economic actors may choose the wrong model, fail to take account of a
particular type of information, or suppress information that does not
conform to the model which has been adopted.12
How might we apply a historical understanding of previous financial crises to the
process of constructing an explanatory framework for our current situation? In one of the
appendices to his previously cited volume, Kindleberger categorized 35 separate financial
crises, dating from the early 17th century to the last decade of the 20th century, on the
basis of the following criteria:
1) The affected countries;
2) The significant economic and political events that were taking place
concurrently;
3) The object of preceding speculative activity;
4) The source of any preceding monetary expansion;
12
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5) The point in time where speculative activity reached its peak;
6) The point in time at which the mania reaches the crisis stage;
7) The relevant lenders of last resort.13
In the context of our current difficulties, it would probably be easier to construct a
list of the unaffected countries around the globe. In recent months, financial markets on
every continent have experienced significant decreases in asset prices.14 Particular
nations, most notably the United States and the United Kingdom, have also undergone a
major decline in housing prices.15 Several political and economic events, which took
place at the end of the last decade and the beginning of this one, each made a contribution
to the process that has led us to our current predicament. The end of the “dot.com”
bubble in technology and Internet-related financial assets, as well as the scandals
surrounding companies such as Enron and Arthur Anderson, fostered a reluctance to
invest in stocks and a search for alternative avenues for profitable investment. As has
been the case in our present time, these developments in the financial sector made their
presence felt in the real economy, as the United States experienced a recession from
March to November of 2001.16 The Federal Reserve responded to this situation by
implementing an expansionary monetary policy, lowering the intended Federal funds rate
11 times in 2001 alone.17 The decline in market interest rates which followed the Federal

13

Ibid., pp. 203-212.
In its year-end review of markets and finance, the Wall Street Journal reported that the Dow Jones World
Index, measured in U.S. dollars, fell by 42.9% in 2008 when the United States was included, and by 46%
when the United States was excluded. Joanna Slater, “Global Markets Are in for Another Tough Slog.”
The Wall Street Journal, January 2, 2009, p. R4. This trend continued into the first two months of 2009.
15
The Economist stated, in a special report last autumn on the world economy, that “on a quarterly basis
prices are now falling in at least half the 20 countries” in its index of housing prices.” Zanny Minton
Beddoes, “When fortune frowned.” The Economist, October 11, 2008, p. 4.
16
The National Bureau of Economic Research. “Business Cycle Expansions and Contractions.”
http://wwwdev.nber.org/cycles/cyclesmain.html Accessed 13 January 2009.
14

6

Reserve’s actions served to encourage investment in the housing sector. The appeal of
housing as an asset choice may also have been reinforced by a shift in the public mood,
following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, in the direction of an intensified
preference for safety and security. Whether or not bricks and mortar was a less risky
investment choice than stocks, bonds, or other financial assets, it was literally and
figuratively “closer to home,” and less likely to be the subject of any future acts of
terrorism. While one might debate the relative weight that should be attached to these
various factors, the results seem reasonably clear in retrospect: an increase in the market
price of housing and related assets as a result of the higher level of demand. This
increase in spending was facilitated by financial institutions, who lowered their lending
standards, particularly in the area of what have become known as “subprime” mortgages,
which were extended to borrowers with lower credit ratings.18 Although much of this
activity took place within an American context, the effects were transmitted globally as
many of these mortgages were packaged into complex securities that were purchased by
investors around the world. As the American and global economies continued to expand
in the middle portion of this decade, the Federal Reserve changed the content of its
monetary policy, raising the intended Federal funds rate on 17 separate occasions, each
time in 25-basis point increments, over a two-year period from 2004 to 2006.19 This
change in direction, however, was not sufficient to allow the housing market to deflate in
a gradual manner. As the economy of the United States began, in 2007, to move towards
17
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the beginning of the current recession in December of that year,20 increasing numbers of
homeowners began experiencing difficulty in making the payments on their mortgages.
As time passed, this situation began to threaten the financial stability of those institutions
who had extended these loans, as well as those who had purchased securities that were
linked to these instruments. The Federal Reserve began to respond to these developments
in September of 2007 by lowering the intended Federal funds rate, a practice that it has
repeated nine times since then in the hope of cushioning the effect of these events on the
real economy. 21 Other central banks around the world have implemented similar policies
which are designed to provide liquidity to the world financial system. 22 While these
measures may be judged, with the passage of time, to have been useful in containing the
damage, they were unable to prevent the global financial crisis that peaked in October of
2008, and which has now turned into the most significant downturn in the global
economy since the end of the Second World War. Olivier Blanchard, chief economist at
the International Monetary Fund, has summarized this chain of events as follows:
“In the context of rapid global integration and deep and complex interconnections
between financial institutions, the crisis quickly moved across assets, markets, and
economies. The rest is history, or, more precisely, history in the making.”23
Part of the “history in the making” to which Blanchard refers is the beginning of
what is reasonably certain to be a long process of debate over the assignment of
responsibility for the chain of events that has brought us to this point in international
20
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economic history. John Taylor, for one, has put forth the case for policy and regulatory
failure as a major causal explanation, arguing that “monetary excesses were the main
cause of the (housing) boom,” and that agencies such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
“were encouraged to expand and buy mortgage-backed securities, including those formed
with the risky subprime mortgages.”24 Robert Shiller, by contrast, has maintained,
employing Keynes’ metaphor of animal spirits, that the recent and current state of our
financial markets is a matter of trust; excessively high during the period when what
Shiller refers to as “complicated strategies of securitization” were being developed, and
excessively low in the aftermath of the “wreckage of formerly towering financial
institutions.”25 Not surprisingly, their alternative “diagnoses” of the causes of our
economic “illness” lead these two economists to purpose different “remedies.” Professor
Taylor maintains that “early on, policy makers misdiagnosed the crisis as one of liquidity,
and prescribed the wrong treatment.”26 He criticizes the creation of the Term Auction
Facility, the passage of the Economic Stimulus Act of 2008, and the Federal Reserve’s
reductions in the target Federal funds rate in late 2007 and early 2008.27 Professor
Shiller, as it turns out, contends that the various interventions by the U.S. Treasury and
the Federal Reserve “so far have been in the right direction,” and his primary critique of
the Obama Administration’s fiscal initiatives is that they should be more extensive in
24
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order to have a greater effect on public confidence.28 While it should be noted that these
two perspectives are not mutually exclusive, at least in terms of their respective views on
the origins of the crisis, it also bears mentioning that the discussion has expanded in
recent months to include an examination of what might be regarded as more foundational
issues with respect to the role of finance in a market economy, or even the market system
itself. In a column published just before Christmas last year, Christopher Caldwell
opined that “the public has no settled idea about whether the global finance system seized
up last summer because it was mismanaged or because it was, in a moral and
metaphysical sense, wrong.”29 Some Christian commentators have been quick to agree
with the observations offered by the Archbishop of Canterbury, Rowan Williams, that
“the credit crunch should be seen as a welcome ‘reality check’ to a climate of
‘unsustainable greed.’”30 In fact, one almost detects a note of glee in some Christian
reflections on recent events and our current state of affairs, viewing the collapse of asset
bubbles and the resulting financial instability as a manifestation of Divine Judgment on
our individual and collective economic sins. Left-leaning observers have used the crisis
as a platform to question the moral standing of financial markets and globalization,31
while some on the Right have emphasized the lack of personal responsibility associated
28
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with a culture of over-consumption and high levels of debt. Philip Booth has cautioned
believers against such a rush to judgment, arguing that “many factors have created the
perfect storm.”32 In addition to errors of judgment in monetary policy, Booth lists
regulatory mistakes, an absence of prudence and caution by financial market participants,
a low level of saving and excessive borrowing by households, and the market transitions
which “have diminished the value of relationships in financial services and replaced a
culture of trust with one of compliance.”33 In some respects, it would be simpler if the
origins of the crisis could be limited to problems that are easily remedied, in a relative
sense, by changes in monetary policy and the regulatory framework which governs
financial markets. Policymakers can take actions which are designed to restrict the
supply of money and credit in an attempt to maintain interest rates at a certain level, and
supervisory agencies can tighten the rules which govern borrowing, lending, and the
purchase of various assets. In spite of the merits that might be associated with these
measures, none of them can ensure that asset bubbles will not make their presence known
again at some point in the future, just as they have in the past.
For the purpose of argument, let us suppose that people around the world,
in the aftermath of recent events, acquire the new perspective on economics and finance –
a more altruistic and less selfish outlook – that Archbishop Williams identified as a sign
of repentance.34 Christian economists would certainly rejoice if global markets came to
be characterized by a higher degree of trust and a lower level of greed.35 Such a turn of
32
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events, however desirable, would not change the fact that all of us, to paraphrase the
Apostle Paul, “see through a glass darkly,” and make decisions in a state of partial
ignorance, compounded by the reality that some of the information that we do possess
may not be accurate or complete.36 James Grant maintains that one of the reasons why
investors were so eager to purchase mortgage-backed securities during the run-up to our
present circumstances – “at interest rates only a few tenths of a percentage point higher
than Treasury-bill yields” - is that they were assigned a triple-A rating at the time.37 With
respect to these evaluations of risk, Charles Goodhart has concluded that “prior to August
2007, there was some general satisfaction among the monetary authorities that the
undesirable and excessive under-pricing of risk” which had taken place previously “was
in the process of being reversed.”38 All of this seems quite consistent with one of Charles
Kindleberger’s historical catalysts for the emergence of financial crises over the
centuries: metaphorical sins of commission (the choice of an inaccurate model or the
suppression of information that does not conform to that model) or omission (failure to
account for a particular type of information.) It also mirrors the judgment by Martin
Wolf that “the benefit and risk of finance are two sides of one coin . . . The risk is that the
resulting pyramids of promises are vulnerable to fraud, deception, and irreducible
uncertainty and so to successive fits of optimism and panic.39
The debate over the causes of the global financial crisis and recession, including
the role of global asset bubbles in this process, will no doubt continue for years to come;
36
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in the words of Charles Goodhart, “it may take quite a long time before a comprehensive
history of this crisis can be written.”40 Goodhart also points out that all of us who are
trying to understand and explain these events bring our personal views to the discussion,
in a manner that is similar to the story of the group of blind men who each feel different
parts of an elephant.41 In that spirit, this paper would agree with the assertion that policy
and regulatory errors tell part of the story, but as Prime Minister Jan Peter Balkenende of
the Netherlands recently pointed out in a public statement preceding the recently
concluded G20 summit in London, rules and oversight will never be “watertight,”
especially at the global level.42 Fallen human beings are also prone to the sin of greed,
but this is not a new phenomenon, and it is quite unlikely to disappear on this side of the
full realization of the Kingdom of God. Another manifestation of human imperfection,
which is more correctable in nature, is the observation that we make decisions in the
presence of imperfect information and inaccurate interpretation of the information that
we do possess, as well as the fluctuations in our “animal spirits.” Therefore, perhaps the
greatest contribution that Christian economists can make in these times is to point the
way towards a more humble and prudential direction for the future of the financial sector,
so that the consequences of our mistakes might be less severe, in a manner that is
analogous to reducing one’s rate of speed when driving in inclement weather. No one
should pretend that this will be an easy task, particularly in a global economic
environment that, despite the recent resurgence of economic nationalism in response to
our present difficulties, is likely to remain highly integrated. As British Prime Minister
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Gordon Brown recently noted at St. Paul’s Cathedral in London, in remarks that were
delivered in advance of the G20 summit, the same process of globalization that has
“lifted millions out of poverty has also unleashed forces that have totally overwhelmed
the old national rules and the systems of financial oversight.”43 In conclusion, Max
Stackhouse offers the following words of encouragement in the direction of this ongoing
mission:
“(The system of modern banking institutions) was built on efforts to form shared
interests with a covenanted sense of being responsible trustees of other people’s money
and trustworthy stewards of institutions. These institutions would in turn be able to
generate wealth for the commonwealth under the watchful eye of a just God. Joint
multinational intervention and civil societal reformation now must reconstruct a
foundational ethic like this for our globalizing era.”44
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